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In his opposing brief. Sua/o urges this Court to adopt a
"reasonableness" standard for eoniplianee with the Immunit} Aet. a standard

that has been consislenlK rejected b> I 'tab's appellate courts. 1ie further
arecs this Court to legislate from the bench b\ inserting an "overlap"

pro\ ision allowing a "reasonable amount of time to accommodate
amendments to the | Division of Corporations and Commercial Code
( jo\ ernmental Immunity] Database." Suiizo Brief, pp. 6-~. Both arguments
;houId be rejected.
A.

I tab courts require strict compliance with the notiee requirements of
the Immunity Aet. Reasonable compliance is NOT the standard.
Sua/o concedes that the notiee of claim provisions of the Immunit}

Aet are "clear on [their| face. "1 here is no ambiguity in the language of the

statute." Id. at p. 3. He further admits that he mailed his Notiee of Claim to
)c\Y Row lev three days after the Database was amended to designate
Kendriek Cowley as the Cit\ A authorized agent. Id. at p. 4.
Sua/o further admits that bis failure to ser\e Mr. Cow le\ w ith his

Notiee o\ (. laim was erroneous, and that his error Ana} not ha\ e been

caused entire!} by SLC's error." Id. at p. A He attempts to excuse bis
failure to Mrictlv compl) with the Immunit) Act by arguing that he

"reasonable complied, and that "but for SLC's error, the notiee would ha\e

been delbered to the appropriate agent." Id. ai p. 5. This argument tails for
several reasons.

first, it is well-settled law in Ltab that strict compliance with the

Immunitx Act's notiee requirements is a jurisdictional prerequisite to tiling
suit. Because the strict compliance standard is adequate]} discussed in the
Ciu "s opening brief, it will not be repeated here.
Second, there is no e\ idenee in the record to support Suu/o's
contention that his "confusion or error" was "due to SLC's filing error." Id.

Lit p. 4. While the City clear!}" belie\ed that the Database mcorreetl} listed
Jeff Row le\ as the Cit\"s designated agent, and asked the DCCC to

immediately correct it. there is no record evidence suggesting that it was due
to any tiling error on the part of the City. It is just as possible that the
IX X ("erred.

Most importantly. howe\er. it is irrelevant whether the Cil\ erred in

listing Mr. Rowley as its designated agent. Had Sua/o sen ed Mr. Rowle_\
w uli his notice of claim on or before November 17, 2004. he el earl} would
ha\ e complied with the unambiguous notice requirements of the Immunit}
Act. I tali Code Ann. ^ ('0-3(>d—!•<)] ( ~ ) oro\ ides Sua/o's argument no

-upport. because it applies only where the go\ ernmental entity tails to "file

or update" the required statement. I lore, there can be no dispute mat the
C:t\ tiled the required statement, and updaled that statement when the need
'OsC.

I bird. Sua/o's reliance on Bisebel is misplaced. "At the time Biseiiel
was d.ecided. the lmmunil\ Aet contained a glaring ambigmi} . . . 11 ]h:>

NiLimhcant gap in the statute was ^orvc^lco in l^OS. As a result, we rejected
the Biseliei court's rationale in (ire_ene \. I 'tab 1ransit Aulbortt}. 200 1 \ ' I

1UA ' :2. 37 P.3d 115b . . ." I)avis \. Central t tab Counseling Center.
2n"M 1 32V 25. 14" P.A1 3l'i). Sua/u concedes that no ^ach ambiguit}

exists here. The Greene court stated. "|w |bere, as here, the statute is clear,
rcad'.w a\;ulab!e. and ca^iA accessible b\ counsel, there is no reason to

require an\ thing less than strict compliance." (ire cue. 2oo 1 I 1 i 110 ai * 14.
finally. Sua/o's contention that he reasonably relied on the

information posted on the DCCC's DuuA^c a\ ails him nodung. flic 1Lo n
\_A Antral 1 tab Con me Iii lg ( 'cuter decision is directi}' on point anil
control 1uin authority. I'here, the plamtitN presented e\ ideuce that their
attorney relied on representations name :\\ cmplo}ees o\ ihc ociendaut
Counsel inn ( 'enter ("( I ( ('" I and tiie \ tali Di\ ision of Mental I leal th ilia t

the ( I CC was a member of the n'j'.iC mental health wMl'MI. Da\_is. 2nuo
ic at:m"::c\ ,nc rebec, on aOormation on'au.e*.: ::'m I

( "tali 1)cpartmen! of I himan Sen ices' website, which listed the ( I ( (
among its "Mental Health oi Iices A id.

As a res Lilt, the ICo n plaint:: n la: led to pro\ ide ('I ( (' w::'n the
notiee required by the Immunitx Act. and the trial court granted summar}
mdemcni in fa\orof('l ( (' for luck of subject matter junsdicnon. On

appeal, plaintiffs asked the I "tab. Supreme ( otirt to consider the contusing
circumstances of their situation and recogm/e an exception to the strict
com pi lance rule. The ('ourt declined to do so.
1be Da\ is Court e\prcssl\ stated that "|b|arring statiuon ainhignit}.
we ha\c eoiisistenllv declined to relax the requirements ol"the Immunit}
Aet." id. ai * 44. '1 be ('ourt noted its dccnion m (ireene. w iiere u reLncd

to create an exception to the strict compliance standard where a suae claims
ad luster allegedly misdirected the plaintiff as to where to send the required
notice. ( ireene. 2001 1 1 1<)0,« 1 . Ahhoue.li the (ireene ('oar: cxnrc-

SL L.

con^-cvi) about the allegations of "lu'entionalb misleadine behu\ lor." ai. at
10. ;t nc\ erthelcss alTirmed dismissal, sUitine;

I \ce as.-aimmg jtbe cHain adulter! made the stateiueiits the
plan :ti ft] alleges be made, his dea\ ei'} iinunctions can not o\ crnde tf.e
requirements set b\ the legislature. Because | the plaint11 i ] tailed to
strictly comply with the lmmunit\ Act. the district court lacked
sii'v'cct matter jurisdiction o\ er h.er claim.

"I he Davis Court expressed its understanding that claimants ma} fan
"b\/.antine and confusing bureaucrac} when dealing with governmental
entities." and that "government employees and officials ma} e\en
mtentinnallx- mislead plaintiffs in some cases, as was alleged in (ireene."
Davis. 2006 L'T 32 at r 46. I lowe\ er. jurisdiction "does not hi nee on the

diflleult} of that task or the earnestness of plaintiffs1 efforts. Jurisdiction
instead springs when a claimant has effected full compliance wlib the
Immunity Act. Barring statutory ambiguit}. "we will not disturb explicit
legislative requirements' and abrogate the government's sovereign
immunit}." Id., quoting Greene. 21)01 CT 109 at * 13.
Because it is conceded that no statuton- ambiguity exists in this

matter, there is no reason tor this Conn to require anything less than strict

compliance with the Immunity Act. Sua/o voluntarily chose the method of
deliv en of bis notiee of claim. In this instance, he chose to sen e the City "s

designated agent, which is. by statute, subject to change at an}" tune, rather
than the Citv Recorder, which does not change (except by legislative action).
Pursuant to the Immunity Act's unambiguous provisions, the Database
cleaiiv identi lied Ken Cow lev as the Citv "s designated agent as ol'

November 1 /. 2004. fhe Database was available to the public for viewing

w lthotit restriction cither v;a internet. telephone. i)V personal consultation
with the D( CC.

know ma that governmental entities may update (i.e. change i the
information contained in the Database, due diligence dictated that he simply
check Hie Database before placing the notice of claim in the mail on
Nov ember 20. 2004. Bv mailing his notice of claim to Jeff Row ley. who

was \() 1 the City's designated agent on \o\ ember 20. 2004. Sua/o tailed
to stricftv comply with the notice of claim requirements ol the immunity
Act. and thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over bis claims
aeamst the (itv.
B.

This (ourt should ileelinc Sua/o's invitation lo legislate from the bench.
It is somewhat difiicult to understand Sua/o's contention that an

"ov crlap of time" provision should be read into the Immunity \et l\ncd o\:
the time delav m dehv ering mailed notices of claim, or where a mailed
notice of claim is forwarded to a designated agent's correct address. .Sec'

.sAa.-o A'/•/(•/. np. 6-A Pursuant to I tab ('od.e Ann. ^ o_C;od-4" 1(3 hb ii u i
ami c os-e-VA 2). a notice of claim n considered to be "hied ov made and

receiv ed bv the stale o\ political siibdiv moiis on the date show n by the post
O t : I cX

• cancellation mark summed anoii the env elope in' oilier appropriate

w

rapper containing it." I ".('. \. ^ (A-iAs.A 2 Ka). Rule n" oi' the I tab Rules

of (iv il Procedure also prov ulcs that sen ice of notices and pleadings by

mail is complete upon mailing. Rule A bn 1)i Bi. I "RCP. 1bercfore. die tone
delav from mailing to receipt of a notice of claim is irrelevant to the issue ol
wnether a notiee of claim has been properly filed.

Sua/o offers speculativ e and untoiaibcd assertions that a

liov en it ncntal entity mav "tie liberateIv eliange| ] the designated agent ev cry
lew bav s. hoping that it will catch claimants unawares."" Sulizh Ann, p. A
1here is no scintilla oW\ idence suggesting that the (it} 'nas ^\onc tun. nor is
there anv need fortius Court to address those speculative concerns. It tins
kind of activ it\ becomes an n^ae in the t'ulure. it is up to the legislature to

cure this potential "weakness" in the statutory scheme, not the courts .

i he legislature is till I\ capable of prov iding for an "ov erlap ol time
m t'nc notice of claim prov isioim o\ the Immunity Act ;I it deems such a

prov isi on necessary. It is not vv ithin the pun icw of this Court to legislate
from the bench, inserting statutorv prov imous vv here none currently exist.
Saa/oA ;;i\ Station to legislate should be directed to our Auis;aturc. not to
tliis court, and should be Oemed

( O V I . l SIO.N

Sua/o's attempts m eonv iuee tills Court to adopt a "reasonableness"

standard in place of long-standing auo consistent precedent requiring, strict
C I

mmiian.ce with the Imintimiv

\c: renin rem cuts should be d.cnicu.

I In

C'ourt should further decline Sua/o A inv nation to legislate from the bench.

Because the notiee of clam; prov ;>:o:i> of the Immunitv Act arc adnmicdlv
dec.:' and unambiguous, and Sua/o has conceded that he faded to -trictly

complv with those requirements, the trial court should have granted the
Ciiv A Motion to I)ismiss for kick of sublect matter jtnisdicdon.

Based on the foregoing. Defendant-Appellant Salt I ukc ("it\
('orporation respect full v requests that this ('ourt RIA b.RSb. the district
courbs denial of the Citv A Motion to Dimiiss. and Kb \1 AN I) dus case to

the district court vv nil nistruetiom to DISMISS Plaintiff-Appellee Sua/o's
(Ampkunt against the ( itv w nil prejudice I'ov lack ol' subject matter
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